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Abstract
The paper presents the newly developed dynamic spatial general equilibrium model of
European Commission - RHOMOLO, in which the interplay of agglomeration and dispersion
forces can be analysed in a novel and theoretically consistent way. A particular attention is
paid to flows of goods, factors and services within and between regions that are generated by
the stimulus to the regions. This will allow an assessment of the feedback to the Member
States and regions and the possibility that in the longer run they will all benefit from the
additional growth that is generated. In doing so, it sheds new light on how the success of
cohesion policy can be measured.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Why developing a new model?
For years, the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European
Commission (DG REGIO) had used economic models for analysing the impact of cohesion
policy programmes. In particular, DG REGIO extensively relied on two models for the
simulation of scenarios related to cohesion policy: HERMIN and QUEST III. HERMIN was
initially developed by an external company in the 1980’s and has been regularly upgraded
since then (Bradley et al., 2003). QUEST III is the model developed and used by Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) (Varga and in ’t Veld, 2011). It is
a model adopting the most recent practices in economic modelling, which is notably reflected
in its high level of micro-foundations.
However, given that both these models produce results at the national level, it was felt
that DG REGIO should extend its analytical capacities to also cover the regional level. After
an in-depth literature review, it appeared that none of the existing models could fully respond
to the need of DG REGIO which hence decided to develop its own regional model.
The objective was to build a dynamic spatial general equilibrium model that would allow
for analysing the impact of cohesion policy at the NUTS 2 level, i.e. the most relevant
geographical level for the policy.1 In order to cover the needs of DG REGIO, the model had
to include several features. In particular, since cohesion policy mostly supports investments
aiming at fostering economic growth in EU regions, the model should be well suited to
capture the impact of the policy the main engines of endogenous growth. At the same time, it
should account for local specificities which may affect the dynamics of the regional economies
(factor endowment, local geography, etc.). Second, the model should incorporate regional
linkages in the line of New Economic Geography and be capable of simulating the impact
of policy shocks on the spatial equilibrium. This implies that model incorporated various
agglomeration and dispersion forces as well as other possible sources of spatial spill-over and
interdependencies.
In practice, a prototype model was first elaborated by a private consultant (TNO)
contracted by DG REGIO.2 The prototype was then passed on to DG REGIO and DG JRC
which closely collaborated for developing the dynamic spatial general equilibrium model for
EU-27 and tested its robustness by running several simulations of various policy scenarios
1In some cases, NUTS 2 regions are relatively small (like for instance in Eastern Germany La¨nders) and
the NUTS1 level was then considered as more appropriate.
2See Ivanova and Kancs (2010) for a formal description of the prototype model.
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related to cohesion policy. The model has been named RHOMOLO for Regional HOlistic
MOdeL.
1.2. Main features of RHOMOLO
The economy consists of R regions r = 1, . . . , R, which are included into M countries
m = 1, . . . ,M . Each region is inhabited by Hr households which are immobile in the short
run, but mobile between regions in the long run. The income of households consists in labour
(wages) and capital (profits and rents) revenues, and is spent to consume goods produced in
R regions of M economies and in the rest of the world, to pay taxes and save.
Each region contains s = 1, . . . , S different economic sectors producing i = 1, . . . , N
goods which are either sold to households or to the other sectors which use them either as
intermediate goods or as investment goods. In each sector, firms operate under monopolistic
competition a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and produce a differentiated variety which is
considered as an imperfect substitute to the other by households and firms. The number of
firms, Ns,r, in sector s and in region r is large enough such that none of them can exercise
market power.
Trade between (and within) regions is costly, implying that the shipping of goods between
(and within) regions entails transport costs which are assumed to be of the iceberg type,
with τs,r,q ≥ 1 representing the quantity of sector’s s goods which needs to be sent from
region r in order to have one unit arriving in region s. Transport costs are assumed to be
identical across varieties but specific to sectors and trading partners. They are related to the
distance separating regions r and q but can also depend on other factors, such as transport
infrastructure or national borders. Finally, transport costs can be asymmetric (i.e. τs,r,q may
differ from τs,q,r). They are also assumed to be positive within a given region (i.e. τs,r,r 6= 1)
which captures among others the distance between customers and firms within the region.
In their production process, firms use a specialised input, denoted by Z, which is produced
by a specific sector whose structure is also monopolistic competition. Each variety of the
specialised input represents a singular process produced by the R&D sector from which the
corresponding licence must be bought.
Each household supplies a specific variety of low, medium and high skilled labour services
to firms which are considered as imperfect substitutes to the ones offered by other households.
Finally, in each country there is a public sector which levies taxes on the income of local
households, firms and production factors. It provides public goods in form of public capital
which is necessary for the operation of firms.
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RHOMOLO is solved in a recursively dynamic framework. Because of the detailed
regional and sectoral dimensions of RHOMOLO, computationally, it would be impossible
to implement full dynamics, as it would exponentially increase the number of non-linear
equations, which need to be solved simultaneously (the number of equations in the static
model times the number of time periods). The recursive dynamic (sequential dynamic)
framework contains a series of static models that are linked between periods by an exogenous
and endogenous variable updating procedure, and are solved sequentially one period after
other. Three types of factors (physical capital, human capital and knowledge capital) are
accumulated endogenously between periods, according to the respective laws of motion. The
formulation of the latter follows the semi-endogenous growth framework of Jones (1995).
It is possible to add updating mechanisms for other variables, such as public expenditure,
transfers, technological change or debt accumulation. As in all recursive dynamic models with
myopic expectations, RHOMOLO assumes that the behaviour of inter-temporally optimising
agents depends only on the current and past states of the economy, but not the result of
inter-temporal optimisation of economic agents.
The model several various agglomeration and dispersion forces affecting the location
choices of firms. These includes backward (firms prefer to have good access to output
markets) and forward linkages (firms prefer to have good access to input markets) as well as
consumer-driven mechanisms. Dispersion forces relate to competition on the goods market
as well as competition for the local labour, part of which is assumed to be immobile.
Given that the endogenous growth and location features make the model very complex,
the present paper aims at presenting the theoretical specifications underlying RHOMOLO
in order to document and clarify the main assumptions and micro-founded mechanisms it
contains.
2. Households
2.1. Consumption
In each period the households make decisions about consumption, savings and labour
supply in order to maximise their utility subject to budget constraint. The utility function is
assumed to be additively separable in consumption and leisure:
Γ
(
U(Ch,q);
∑
e=lo,me,hi
V (1− lh,qe )
)
= U(Ch,q) +
∑
e=lo,me,hi
V (1− lh,qe )
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where the total endowment of time = 1, and lh,qe is labour of household h in region q with
skills e (e = lo,me, hi denote low-, medium- and high-skilled component respectively).
Households consume Ns differentiated goods from S sectors. Relative preferences for the
respective sectors are represented by weight βs with
∑Ns
s=1 βs = 1. Each household has thus
not only to decide about the total level of consumption but also about the composition of
the consumption bundle, which consists of S goods and N varieties produced in R regions.
We assume a CES utility function,3 implying that consumer h located in region q has the
following consumption related utility:
U(Ci,s,rh,q ) =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
βs
Ns,r∑
i=1
(
Ci,s,rh,q
)θ) 1θ
(1)
The representative household chooses a consumption bundle in order to maximise utility
subject to the budget constraint:
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
τs,r,qpi,s,r (1− ts,r)Ci,s,rh,q = Ich,q,
where pi,s,r is the price of consumption good i produced in sector s and in region r, I
c
h,q is
the disposable income household h located in region q spends on consumption, τs,r,q is trade
cost between r and q, and ts,r is tax rate on activity s in region r.
4
The rest of the world is modelled as a particular region, with index r = R, and a particular
sector (indexed by S). Sector S differs from EU sectors in that it only has one variety which
is exclusively produced in region R. The price of this variety is assumed to be exogenous
to the EU economy. Formally, we have NS,r = 0 and Ns,R = 0 for all r and s; NS,R = 1
and pS,R = p¯S,R. We also assume that foreign households have the same type of preference
regarding domestic goods and that the share of their disposable income devoted to the
consumption of domestic goods is fixed.
The associated Lagrangian is:
L =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
βs
Ns∑
i=1
(Ci,s,rh,q )
θ
) 1
θ
+ λ
(
Ich,q −
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
τs,r,qpi,s,r (1− ts,r)Ci,s,rh,q
)
.
3The model as coded incorporates a nested CES utility function to allow for different elasticities of
substitution between varieties of a given sector on the one hand and sectors on the other hand. This feature
is not introduced here to simplify notations.
4Note that τs,r,qpi,s,r = pi,s,q, where pi,s,q is consumer price.
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The first order condition is given by:
∂U(Ch,q)
∂Ci,s,rh,q
− λτs,r,qpi,s,r (1− ts,r) = 0
for all i, s, r. After rearranging terms and substituting in the budget constraint, the optimal
consumption of good Ci,s,rh,q is given by:
Ci,s,rh,q =
(
βs
pi,s,rτs,r,q
)σ Ich,q∑R
r=1
∑S
s=1
∑Ns
i=1 β
σ
s (pi,s,r (1− ts,r) τs,r,q)1−σ
(2)
where σ = 1/(1− θ). Note that Ich,q is in nominal terms, while Ci,s,rh,q is in real terms.
When introducing the consumption price index for region q:
Pc,q =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
βσs (pi,s,r (1− ts,r) τs,r,q)1−σ
) 1
1−σ
(3)
equation (2) can be rewritten as
Ci,s,rh,q =
(
1
βs
pi,s,r (1− ts,r) τs,r,q
P cq
)−σ
Ich,q
P cq
(4)
According to (4), the optimal amount of good Ci,s,rh,q can be represented as a fraction of the
total amount of income spent on consumption Ich,q. This fraction obviously decreases in the
price of that good and the related transport cost, and increases with the relative weight βs
and the overall price index level.
The budget constraint of household h in region q can then be written as:
P cqCh,q + Sh,q = Ih,q,
stating that total consumption and savings equal total income Ih,q.
We assume that a constant fraction s of total disposable income is saved, i.e. Ich,q =
(1− s)Ih,q. The total consumption in nominal terms can then be written as:
P cqCh,q = (1− s)Ih,q,
where Ch,q =
∑R
r=1
∑S
s=1
∑Ns,r
i=1 C
i,s,r
h,q , i.e. the aggregated consumption level of household h
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located in region q.
Total disposable income Ih,q of household h located in region q is the sum of labour and
capital income and government transfers after taxes:
Ih,q =
∑
e
wz,ql
h
e,q(1− tw) + (1− tpi)KI +
TRH,m∑Rm
r=1Hr
,
where wqe is the wage paid in region q to the skill level e, KI is capital income, and TRH,m
denote transfers to households in country m.
Disposable income of foreign households is considered as given. Also, the price index
relevant for foreign consumers, PCR is assumed to be independent both from domestic prices
and from domestic transport costs. This implies that, while domestic prices and the structure
of transport costs determine how exports from the rest of the world are distributed across
regions and sectors, total export is exogenous to the model.
When aggregating individual consumption Ci,s,rh,q over all households Hq within region q
and over all regions R we obtain the total demand for consumption of good i from sector s.
R∑
r=1
R∑
q=1
Hq∑
h=1
Ci,s,rh,q = C
i,s. (5)
2.2. Labour supply
Each household supplies a differentiated variety of labour which contains a low, medium
and high skilled component. Hence, each household has to decide which fraction of its time
endowment will be devoted respectively to work and to leisure.
As noted above, the utility of households is assumed to be additively separable in
consumption Ch,q and leisure 1− lh,qe . Preferences related to consumption are represented
as a CES utility function of goods from all varieties, sectors and regions as given by (1).
When rewriting (1) in terms of individual aggregated consumption Ch,q we obtain that
U(Ch,q) = Ch,q. The sub-utility with respect to leisure takes a CES form with a standard
labour supply elasticity and a skill specific weight ωe on leisure in order to capture differences
in employment levels across skill groups. So we have∑
e
V (1− lh,qe ) =
∑
e
ωe
1− κ(1− l
h,q
e )
1−κ.
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The associated Lagrangian is
L = Ch,q +
∑
e
V (1− lh,qe )+
λ
(
P cqCh,q − (1− s)
∑
e
wqel
h,q
e (1− tw) + (1− tpi)KI +
TRH,m∑Rm
r=1Hr
)
After deriving the first order conditions with respect to Ch,q, 1 − lh,qe and λ, and after
rearranging terms we obtain the following expression for the optimal labour supply across
skill groups:5
lh,qe = 1−
ωeP
c
q
(1− s)wqe (6)
Aggregating per skill group at the regional level we obtain:
Hq∑
h=1
lh,qe = Hq
(
1− ωeP
c
q
(1− s)wqe
)
(7)
Labour markets are characterised by monopolistic competition. Each worker/household
sets its wage as a mark-up over the reservation wage (i.e. the marginal utility of leisure
divided by the marginal utility of consumption) and the wage equation is given by equation
(6). The employment level on market r is then given by total demand addressed to each skill
group at the prevailing wage.
As unemployment decisions are not considered in the current version of RHOMOLO, the
workers taking up the newly created jobs are either former non-participants, or new migrants
into the region Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989).6 Writing ′ for the growth rate of a variable,
the underlying labour market accounting rule implies that
L
′
e,q =
(
Le,q
He,q
)′
+H
′
e,q (8)
such that the growth of employment, L
′
e,q, must equal the sum of the growth of the
employment rate, (Le,q/He,q)
′, and the growth of the labour force, H
′
e,q, which occurs through
5The code version of the model currently includes an inelastic short run labour supply curve. In the long
run, however, labour supply reacts to changes in real wages through labour migration. The elastic version of
the short run labour supply curve as presented in this paper will soon be introduced in the codes.
6In the next version of RHOMOLO (currently under development) both unemployment and participation
will be present.
7
a combination of exogenous demographic changes, and endogenous migration (see Brandsma
et al. (2013) for details). Inter-regional labour migration is an important channel of adjustment
to macroeconomic and policy shocks. The population change in region r with labour force
Hr due to migration is difference between the incoming and outgoing migration:∑
r
He,r · se,r,q −
∑
q
He,q · se,q,r (9)
where se,r,q and se,q,r are the shares of migrants in the total population in regions r and
q, respectively.7
3. Firms
3.1. Final demand goods
The production function of a monopolistically competitive firm producing variety i of
final demand good s located in region r is of the Leontieff type. The arguments are the
quantities of intermediate goods bought from all sectors and a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of all
inputs used in the production process, i.e. labour and a specialised input:
Xi,s,r = min{yi,s,r, a1sX1i,s,r, ausXui,s,r, aSsXSi,s,r} (10)
where Xi,s,r is the quantity produced, yi,s,r is firm i’s value added, X
u
i,s,r is the intermediate
input from sector u and aus the associated technical coefficient, assumed to be common to
all firms in sector s independently of their location. Variable Xui,s,r is a CES aggregate of
varieties produced in sector u:
Xui,s,r =
(
R∑
q=1
Nu,q∑
j=1
xj,u,qi,s,r
θ
) 1
θ
for 0 < θ < 1.
Value added is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the two factors used in the production
process:8
yi,s,r = Z
αs
i,s,rL
1−αs
i,s,r KG
αG
r − FCr (11)
7See Brandsma et al. (2013) for a more detailed description of labour migration in RHOMOLO.
8The model as coded currently assumes a Leontieff technology to describe value added. This will soon be
changed to align with the specification adopted in this paper.
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where Zi,s,r and Li,s,r are CES aggregates of the varieties of specialised inputs and of the
various types of labour –low-, medium- and high-skilled– used by the firm.9 We write KGr
for the stock of public capital available in region r which is assumed to be positively related
to total factor productivity.10 Finally, FCr is a fixed cost made of some of the firm’s output.
Specialised inputs and labour are assumed to be non-tradable which implies that firms in
regions r can only obtain those two factors on the local market. The respective CES indices
then read
Zi,s,r =
(
Ar∑
k=1
zk,ri,s,r
ρ
) 1
ρ
Li,s,r =
( ∑
e=lo,me,hi
γe
Jr∑
h=1
lh,ei,s,r
σ
) 1
σ
where ρ, σ ∈ (0, 1). Factor γe accounts for difference in labour productivity between low,
medium and skilled labour, with γlo < γme < γhi.
Profit maximisation leads the firm to set the output price as a mark-up over marginal
cost, where the mark-up depends on the elasticity of the total demand it faces which. This
includes demand from consumers as well as demand from other firms either for intermediate
goods or for investment goods. Given our assumptions concerning the utility function and
the CES aggregates of intermediate inputs and of physical capital (see below), the elasticity
of total demand is 1/(θ − 1) and the price-making rule is
pi,s,r (1− ts,r) = MCi,s,r
θ
(12)
The marginal cost includes the cost of production factors and the cost of intermediate
inputs:
MCi,s,r = P
y
i,s,r +
S∑
u=1
aus · P ui,s,r
where P yi,s,r is the price of value added. Given the specification adopted for valued added,
9The firm uses effective units of labour which includes both physical units of labour and the associated
human capital.
10Note that according to this specification, each firm can benefit from the whole stock of public capital
available in the region where it is located. This reflects the public good nature of public capital and in
particular that it is non-rivalrous. We also assume it is non-excludable in that its use by firms does not incur
direct payment but only indirect ones (the provision of pubic capital is financed by taxes) which are not
internalised by the firm.
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P yi,s,r is common to all firms in sector s and region r and corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas of
the factors’ price:
P yi,s,r = KG
−αG
r ·
(
PZi,s,r
αs
)αs
·
(
Wi,s,r
1− αs
)1−αs
P ui,sr, P
Z
i,sr and Wi,s,r are the price indices corresponding to the CES aggregates of respectively
of intermediate inputs, specialised inputs and labour varieties:
P ui,s,r =
(
R∑
q=1
Nu,q∑
j=1
(pj,u,q (1− ts,r) · τu,q,r) θθ−1
) θ−1
θ
(13)
PZi,s,r =
(
Ar∑
k=1
(pzk,r)
ρ
ρ−1
) ρ−1
ρ
(14)
Wi,s,r =
( ∑
e=lo,me,hi
γ
1
1−σ
e
Jr∑
h=1
w
σ
σ−1
h,r,e
)σ−1
σ
(15)
where pj,u,q is the price set by firm (j, u, q), p
z
k,r is the price of variety (k, r) of the specialised
input and wh,r,e is the wage of household (h, r) for his labour service of skill e. We assume
symmetry across firms (resp. households) in terms of the technology (resp. preferences)
which implies that the price (resp. wage) set by each firm (resp. household) within one given
region is the same. Accordingly, one easily verifies that P ui,s,r = P
u
r for all (i, s), P
Z
i,s,r = P
Z
r
for all (i, s), Wi,s,r = Wr for all (i, s), and P
y
i,s,r = P
y
s,r for all i. Note that we also assume
that specialised inputs are not subject to transport costs (i.e. τZ,r,r = 1).
The demand of the firm for each variety of intermediate input, specialised input and
labour then take, respectively, the following form:
xj,u,qi,s,r =
(
pj,u,q (1− ts,r) τu,q,r
P ur
) 1
θ−1
Xui,s,r (16)
zk,ri,s,r =
(
pk,r
PZr
) 1
ρ−1
Zi,s,r (17)
lh,ei,s,r =
(
wh,e
γeWr
) 1
σ−1
Li,s,r (18)
3.2. R&D sector
There are M national R&D sectors which produce new designs ∆Dm using all varieties
of skilled labour available on the national labour market. The production process features
10
learning by doing, as labour productivity is positively related to the pre-existing stock of
designs. Finally, there are international technological spill-over in the sense that the national
R&D sector absorbs part of the technology produced within the M countries. The production
function of the R&D sector of country m reads
∆Dm = (D
∗)ω ·Dφm · (LhiR&D,m)
where D∗ is the stock of design in the M economies and LhiR&D,m is a CES aggregate of the
national skilled labour varieties
LhiR&D,m =
(
Rm∑
r=1
Jr∑
h=1
(lh,hi,rR&D )
σ
) 1
σ
Perfect competition prevails on each national market for designs and firms maximise
profits by choosing the level of new designs and the corresponding quantity of skilled labour
employed in each variety:
∆Dm =
(

Ξ
· PD,m
WR&D,m
) 
1−
where Ξ = ((D∗)−ω(Dm)−φ)1/, PD,m is the price of new designs, and WR&D,m is the CES
wage index for the R&D sector:
WR&D,m =
(
Rm∑
r=1
Jr∑
h=1
w
σ
σ−1
h,hi,r
)σ−1
σ
.
Note that given the constant return to scale technology of the R&D sector, the average cost
corresponds to the marginal cost and there is no profit at equilibrium. However, licences
generate a rent which is supposed to be distributed to the skilled labour employed in the
R&D sector.
3.3. Specialised input sector
In order to start operating, representative firm v in the specialised input sector of region
r must acquire one design and transform it into a new production process. The firm can
only obtain designs from its national R&D sector by buying a licence which must be renewed
each period. It must also support a fixed cost denoted by FCv,r. The firm operates under
11
monopolistic competition and produces one variety of specialised input using physical capital:
zv,r = Kv,r (19)
Capital is financed by selling assets av,r on the M national financial markets, which
implies that av,r = P
k
rKv,r, with P
k
r being the price of physical capital. Asset av,r yields a
gross return rkv,rP
k
r which corresponds to the rental price for one unit of capital. We assume
capital to depreciate at rate δ.
Each unit of capital is a CES aggregate of varieties of goods bought in all regions:
Kv,r =
(
R∑
q=1
S∑
s=1
βθs
Ns,q∑
i=1
(ki,s,qv,r )
θ
) 1
θ
(20)
This corresponds to the CES aggregate representing preferences of consumers which implies
that price of capital is equal to the consumer price index, i.e. P kr = P
C
r . Importantly, note
that the price of capital is region-specific. This reflects the fact that varieties constituting
physical capital must partly be imported. Given the existence of transport cost, this means
that physical capital is more costly in small/peripheral regions.
Transforming designs into an effective new production process is uncertain. We assume
the probability to succeed in using a new design φ depends on some regional characteristics,
namely the existing stock of processes which also corresponds to the number of specialised
input firms Ar and the stock of human capital h
hi
r :
φr =
(
Ar∑Rm
r=1Ar
)ν (
Hr∑Rm
r=1Hr
)1−ν
. (21)
The regional stock of human capital is defined as the number of effective units of high skilled
labour available in region r, i.e hhir =
∑Hr
h=1 h
hi
h,rL¯
hi
h,r.
The expected profit of the specialised input firm then reads:
piv,r = φr ·
[
pzv,rzv,r − rkv,rPCr Kv,r − PD,m − FCv,r
]
(22)
Profit maximisation under the constraint (19) leads the specialised input firm to address
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the following demand for each variety of good:
ki,s,qv,r =
(
pi,s,q · τs,q,r
βθs · PCr
) 1
θ−1
Kv,r (23)
The firm also sets its price as a mark-up over marginal cost with
pv,r =
MCv,r
θ
(24)
where MCv,r = r
k
v,rP
C
r . This implies that production of the specialised input firm and hence
its demand for capital depends negatively on the rental price of capital and positively on
the demand addressed to the firm (accelerator mechanism). Investment corresponds to the
variation in the stock of capital net of depreciation:
Iv,r = ∆Kv,r − δKv,r
It is financed by the issuance of new assets; i.e. PCr · Iv,r = ∆av,r.
4. Public sector
4.1. Government
We assume a multi-level governance framework where the national government interacts
with the EU level. The expenditure of the national government consists in consumption of
goods and services GCm, transfers to households TRH,m and government investment GIm.
These components of government expenditure are all assumed to be fixed at exogenous levels,
they can serve as variables for modelling policy shocks.
Let Gm denote the sum of government consumption and investment. We assume gov-
ernment consumption and investment to be distributed among the regions of country m
according to the shares of the population:
Gq =
Jq
Jm
·Gm
where Gq,m corresponds to public consumption and investment taking place in region q
(assumed to be in country m).
Analogously to households and firms, the regional governments have CES preference
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defined over the set of varieties produced in the domestic economy and abroad. We have:
Gq =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
βs
Ns,r∑
i=1
(
Ci,s,rG,q
)θ) 1θ
The demand addressed by the public sector of region q to firm i, s, r is then:
ci,s,rG,q =
(
1
βs
pi,s,rτr,q
P cq
)−σ
Gq
The government contributes to the EU budget and in particular to cohesion policy funding
COH proportionally to its weight in the EU GDP:
TREU,m =
GDPm
GDP
· COH
where GDPm =
∑Rm
r=1
∑S
s=1
∑Ns,r
i=1 yi,s,r and GDP =
∑
mGDPm.
The government levies taxes on consumption, production as well as on capital and labour
income which constitutes its revenues:
Tm = tC
Rm∑
r=1
PCr · Cr + ti,s,r ·Xi,s,r + tW
(
Rm∑
r=1
∑
e=lo,me,hi
Jr∑
h=1
wh,e,r · lh,r,e
)
+
(
tpi
Rm∑
r=1
{
S∑
s
Ns,r∑
i=1
pii,s,r +
∑
v=1
Arpiv,r
})
where pii,s,r and piv,r are the profits of the representative firms producing respectively a variety
of goods and specialised inputs.
The public deficit in country m is the difference between government expenditures,
including interests on the outstanding debt, and revenues:
PDm =
Rm∑
q=1
P cq ·Gq + TRH,m + TREU,m + Subm − Tm
where Subm are government subsidies which reduce the fixed cost of specialised input
firms.
14
4.2. Modelling policy intervention
In order to model the European Cohesion Policy (ECP) interventions, we regroup the
different ECP expenditure categories into 4 (5) broader groups of policy instruments (see
Table 1). R&D related policy measures are modelled either as a reduction of fixed costs
in R&D sector, Subm, or as a reduction of physical capital’s transport costs, τ
k
rq. Policy
instruments aimed at increasing human capital are modelled either as an education investment
in skill-specific human capital, he, or as a reduction of skill-specific labour taxes, t
l
er. Transport
infrastructure investments are modelled as a reduction of trade costs, τrq. Other infrastructure
investments are implemented in RHOMOLO as an increase of the stock of public capital,
KGr. Those ECP policy measure affecting particular industries or services are modelled
either as a reduction of output taxes (increase of output subsidies), tyrs, or as a reduction of
capital taxes, tkrs. The latter measures would increase the stock of capital in the subsidised
industries.
Table 1: Modelling of policy intervention in RHOMOLO
Field Implementation in Rhomolo Variables
RTD Reduction of fixed costs in specialised input sector Subm
Reduction of physical capital’s transport costs τ krq
Human resources Education investment in skill-specific human capital he (Λe)
Reduction of skill-specific labour taxes tler
Infrastructure Reduction of trade costs τrq
Increase of the stock of public capital KGr
Industry and services Reduction of output taxes (increase of subsidies) tyrs
Reduction of capital taxes tkrs
Notes: The presented policy interventions are illustrative. Many more policy instruments and their combinations can be
implemented in RHOMOLO. Category ’Technical Assistance’ is not considered currently.
In order to translate particular policy measures into model variables, we make use of
complementary models at the European Commission, or employ estimates from the literature.
For example, in order to simulate the TEN-T investments in transport infrastructure, we run
two models (TRANSTOOLS and RHOMOLO) and use the output of the former as input
in the latter. In the first step, the improvements in the transport network due to transport
infrastructure investments are simulated in the transport model (TRANSTOOLS), where
the units of measurement are kilometres of new infrastructure, number of additional lanes,
maximum speed, etc. In the second step, the changes (improvements) in the accessibility
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(market access) of regions are simulated in the economic model (RHOMOLO), where the
units of measurement are relative prices, wages, employment, GDP, etc.
In addition to supply-side effects listed in Table 1, the ECP interventions have also
demand-side effects. Both the demand and supply side effects together with the induced
general equilibrium effects determine the net policy impact and hence all are important
for policy incidence. The demand-side effects are implemented as additional government
expenditure of final demand and investments goods. The government expenditure shares of
different sectors are the same as in the base year.
5. Market equilibrium and closure rules
5.1. Goods, input and innovation markets
All households and all firms within a given sector are assumed to be symmetric, which
implies that, in a specific regions r, wages and quantities consumed are identical for all
households while prices and quantities produced are identical for all firms.
The firm producing variety i of good s in region r faces demand from four types of agents:
households (domestic and foreign) Di,s,rH , other firms producing goods D
i,s,r
F , firms producing
specialised inputs Di,s,rK and the domestic public sector D
i,s,r
G :
Di,s,rH =
R∑
q=1
Jq · ci,s,rh,q
Di,s,rF =
S∑
u=1
R∑
q=1
(Ju,q · xj,u,q)i,s,r
Di,s,rK =
R∑
q=1
(Aq · kv,q)i,s,r
Di,s,rG =
R∑
q=1
−1ci,s,rG,q
where ci,s,rh,q , x
i,s,r
j,u,q and k
i,s,r
v,q are respectively given by equations (4), (16) and (23). The
four components of the total demand feature the same price elasticity and the firm sets
its price, pi,s,r, according to the rule given by equation (12), thereby equating demand and
supply:
Xi,s,r = D
i,s,r
H +D
i,s,r
F +D
i,s,r
K +D
i,s,r
G
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GDP of region r then corresponds to
∑S
s=1Ns,r · P yi,s,r · yi,s,r =
∑S
s=1Ns,r · P yi,s,r ·Xi,s,r,
where Xi,s,r = D
i,s,r
C +D
i,s,r
F +D
i,s,r
K .
On the market for specialised inputs of region r, the representative firm v faces the
following demand:
Dv,rF =
S∑
u=1
Ns,r · zv,ri,s,r
where zv,ri,s,r is specified by equation (17). The price setting rule (24) ensures that supply
equals demand so that
zv,r = D
v,r
F
Finally, the demand for new designs addressed to the R&D sector corresponds to the
number of new firms entering the marker for specialised input
∑Rm
r=1 ∆N
z
r . The number of
entrants, ∆N zr , depends on the price of new design, PD,m, so that at equilibrium ∆D
r
m = ∆N
z
r .
5.2. Financial markets
We select a saving driven closure rule where private saving is determined as a constant
faction of households’ income (see above). At equilibrium, (i) private saving must finance
private investment, the public deficit and the deficit of the trade balance; and (ii) returns on
the three types of assets held by households must be equal. Finally, we assume that financial
markets are fully integrated at the level of the m countries.
Private investment in region r is the sum of investment of firms of the specialised input
sector: Ir =
∑Ar
v=1 P
C
r · Iv,r = Ar · PCr · Iv,r.
The trade balance deficit of each country (TBm) corresponds to the value of its exports
minus the value of its imports, TBm = Xm −Mm where:
Xm =
Rm∑
r=1
S−1∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
pi,s,r · cR)i,s,r (25)
Mm =
Rm∑
r=1
Jr∑
h=1
pR,R · τR,R,r · ch,r)R,R (26)
The trade balance of the domestic economy then corresponds to the sum of the national
trade balances with respect to the rest of the world:
TB =
M∑
m=1
TBm = 0
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We therefore have
R∑
r=1
Hr∑
h=1
Sh,r =
R∑
r=1
ArP
C
r · Ir +
M∑
m=1
PDm
Finally, arbitrage on the financial markets equalises net returns on financial assets. The
net return for holding capital in firm v, r is (rkv,r − δ)PCr + (1− δ)∆PCr . Firms are symmetric
and hence rkv,r = r
k
r for all v. Letting rG,m denote the return on government bonds of country
m and rF the return on foreign bonds, the arbitrage condition is
(rkr − δ)PCr + (1− δ)∆PCr = rG,m = rF
for all m and for all r. Note that the required gross return for physical capital rkrP
C
r is higher
in regions where the price of capital PCr is high. This reflects the fact that depreciation incurs
a higher financial loss when the resources needed to acquire capital are more important,
which is for instance the case in remote regions.
6. Location and spatial equilibrium
6.1. Agglomeration and dispersion forces
In order to model the location of economic agents endogenously, two agglomeration forces
(increasing returns to scale and localised externalities), and two dispersion forces (trade costs
and imperfect competition) are introduced in RHOMOLO.11
Both consumers and producers face positive trade costs for importing final demand goods
and intermediate inputs, respectively. On the consumer side, trade costs enter the consumer
price index (3). On the producer side, trade costs enter the intermediate goods price index
(13). As usual, inter-regional trade costs, τrq, are modelled as iceberg costs of trade. However,
departing from the new economic geography literature, the bilateral trade costs between
regions are not symmetric, the internal trade costs are positive, and the inter-regional trade
costs come from the data, instead of being calibrated or proxied by distance.
Increasing returns to scale are introduced via fixed costs, FCr, in firm production functions
(11) and (22). Following Venables (1996), they are made of part of the firms output. Fixed
costs are measured in quantity terms, and firms pay them at the beginning of each period
(before starting to produce market output). In contrast to the iceberg trade costs, fixed costs,
11See Kancs (2013) for a detailed description of agglomeration and dispersion forces and mechanisms in
RHOMOLO.
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FCr, is strictly speaking not a parameter that can be calibrated, though, they can be used
in policy simulations.
Localised externalities enter RHOMOLO trough the stock of public capital, KGαGr , in
the value added production function (11), technological spillovers, Dφm, and probability to
succeed in transforming designs into a new production process, φr, which depends on the
existing stock of processes, Ar, and the stock of human capital, h
hi
r , in region r (equation
21). Localised externalities are region-specific, and determine the relationship between the
density of workers and firms in a region, and the productivity of particular inputs in the
regions’ value added production function (specialised inputs, capital and labour).
Imperfect competition is modelled in the monopolistic competition framework of Dixit–
Stiglitz. First, we assume that each firm produces a differentiated product (variety), which
is an imperfect substitute for other products. In the same time, we assume that the real or
perceived non-price differences are not large enough to eliminate other varieties as substitutes.
Product differentiation is captured by the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ,
which is larger than one, but smaller than infinity. Second, we assume that there is free entry
and exit on each market, implying that firm profits are zero in the long run (equation 28).
6.2. Spatial equilibrium
In the short run, pure profit may exist. However, in the long run, this will trigger the
entry of new firms on the market which will decrease the demand addressed to each firm and
hence reduce the level of profit 12. This process takes place until pure profits are completely
exhausted. The profit of firm i, s, r reads
pii,s,r = pi,s,r (1− ti,s,r) ·Xi,s,r − P yi,s,r · yi,s,r −
S∑
u=1
P ur ·Xui,s,r − P yi,s,r · FCr
= pi,s,r (1− ti,s,r) ·Xi,s,r − P yi,s,r ·Xi,s,r −
S∑
u=1
au−1s · P ur ·Xi,s,r − P yi,s,r · FCr (27)
Pure profit is equal to zero when the price equals average cost, i.e.
0 = pi,s,r (1− ts,r)− P yi,s,r −
S∑
u=1
au−1s · P ur − P yi,s,r · FCr/Xi,s,r (28)
12The expressions describing total demand are relatively complicated but one can indeed show that it is a
decreasing function of the number of firms. In the simple case where there is only one sector and one region,
the demand addressed to the representative firm by consumers is 1/N · I/p where I is the income devoted to
consumption
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Using the price setting rule (12), one obtains the level of production corresponding to zero
pure profit:
X∗i,s,r =
P yi,s,r · FCr
1−θ
θ
·
[
P yi,s,r −
∑S
u=1 a
u
s
−1 · P ur
]
The same mechanism applies to the specialised input sector. For a representative firm of
the sector, pure profits are exhausted when demand is such that the price it sets is equal to
average cost:
pv,r = r
k
v,rP
C
r + PD,m/zv,r + FCv,r/zv,r
By equation (24), the price is a mark-up over marginal cost which, combined to the
expression above, gives the production level which annihilates pure profit:
z∗v,r =
PD,m + FCv,r
1−ρ
ρ
· [rkv,rPCr ]
We then have a system of sxr equations of the type X∗i,s,r = D
i,s,r
C +D
i,s,r
F +D
i,s,r
K plus
r equations z∗v,r = D
v,r
F with sxr + r unknowns corresponding to the long term number of
firms in each sector and in each region, N∗s,r and N
z
r
∗.
Transition to the long term number of firms is not immediate and is described by the
following law of motion, which is assumed to be the same in every region and sector:
∆N = λ · (N − N∗). The change in the number of specialised firms also determines the
demand for new designs addressed to the R&D sector with:
∆Drm = ∆N
z
r
The number of firms in each region determines the spatial distribution of economic activity
in model. It is fully endogenous and incorporates several agglomeration and dispersion forces.
6.3. Endogenous location effects
Three effects drive the mechanics of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion of economic
agents in RHOMOLO: the market access effect, the price index effect and the market crowding
effect.
The market access effect explains why firms in large/central regions tend to have higher
profits than firms in small/peripheral regions, and hence the tendency of firms to locate their
production in large/central regions and export to small/peripheral regions.
There are two sources for higher profits in large/central regions. First, due to positive
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trade costs, the demand for a region’s output increases with it’s relative accessibility and
the economic size of the region. This can be seen by combining equations (4), (5) and (27),
according to which the total demand, Cisr , for good i in sector s produced in region r, and
hence profit, piisr , is increasing with lower trade costs, τrq, with elasticity σ. The weighted
average trade costs can be lower either due to large internal market (because τrr < τrq∀rq),
or due to central location of a region (good accessibility), or both.
Second, the profitability of firms is further enhanced by increasing returns, since growth in
their output reduces the average production costs. This can be seen by combining equations
(10), (11) and (27), according to which, if everything else would stay constant (also fixed
cost, FCr), then an increase in output, Xisr, would reduce the share of fixed costs, FCr, in
average costs, and hence increase firm profits, piisr .
The price index effect describes the impact of firms’ location and trade costs on the
cost of living of workers, and cost of intermediate inputs for producers of final demand
goods. Given that large/central regions with more firms import a narrower range of products,
reducing in such a way trade costs, goods tend to be less expensive in large/central regions
than in small/peripheral regions. This can be seen in the consumer price index (3), and the
intermediate input price index (13), respectively. Both price indices suggest that the total
trade costs,
∑R
r=1 τrq, and hence the cost of living and producing, respectively, would be
lower in large/central regions. The regional price index decreases in trade costs with elasticity
1: reducing trade costs by one unit would reduce regional price by one unit. Because of lower
costs of living/production, firms (purchasing intermediate inputs) and consumers (purchasing
final goods) would prefer to locate in large/central regions.
The market crowding effect because of higher competition on input and output markets,
firms prefer to locate in small/peripheral regions with fewer competitors. As firms set up
in large/central regions, competition between firms gets fiercened there (market crowding
effect). When the number of firms in large/central regions increases, the consumption of
differentiated goods is fragmented over a larger number of varieties (firms), implying that
each firm’s output and profits decrease. Given that the entry of new firms has a negative
effect on profitability of incumbents in large/central regions, this competition effect works
against the tendency to agglomeration.
The competition effect on output markets can be seen in equation (2), according to which,
the demand of output produced by firm i in sector s in region r is decreasing in the number
of firms selling their output in region q with elasticity 1. For example, a 10% increase in
the number of firms selling good s in region q would reduce demand for firm i’s output by
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10%. Lower output, and hence profits, would induce firms to move away from large/central
regions to small/peripheral regions with fewer competitors.
The competition effect on input markets works through prices of spatially immobile
(semi-mobile in the short-run) production factors. Agglomeration of firms in large/central
regions would bid up prices for immobile (semi-mobile) production factors, making production
more costly, which would reduce firm profits.
6.4. Mechanisms of agglomeration and dispersion
The model contains three endogenous location mechanisms that bring the agglomeration
and dispersion about: the mobility of capital, the mobility of labour, and vertical linkages
(see Table 2).
Table 2: Mechanisms and forces of agglomeration and dispersion in RHOMOLO
mobility of capital mobility of labour vertical linkages
market access effect ⇑ ⇑ ⇑
price index effect ⇑ ⇑
market crowding effect ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Notes: ⇑ denotes agglomeration, ⇓ denotes dispersion.
Following the mobile capital framework of Martin and Rogers (1995), we assume that (i)
capital is mobile between regions; and (ii) the mobile capital repatriates all of its earnings to
its region of origin.
Following the mobile labour framework of Krugman (1991), in RHOMOLO, we assume
that workers are spatially mobile (though the mobility is not perfect). Second, mobile workers
not only produce in the region where they settle (as the mobile capital does), but they
also spend their income there (which is not the case with capital owners). Third, workers’
migration is governed by differences in the expected income, and differences in the costs of
living between regions (the mobility of capital is driven solely by differences in the nominal
rates of return).13
Following the vertical linkage framework of Venables (1996), we assume that, in addition
to primary factors, firms use intermediate inputs in the production process. Second, similarly
to final goods consumers, firms value the variety of intermediate inputs. Third, the trade of
intermediate inputs is costly.
13In the model also the regional unemployment rates enter the migration problem of workers.
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7. Conclusions
Cohesion policy shifts the spatial equilibrium at the regional level within the EU and the
Member States by increasing the capacity for growth in the regions that are lagging behind
and to some extent also by mobilising the unused capacity in other regions. It does so by
supporting investments in the trans-European infrastructure networks connecting the regions
as well as by stimulating measures fostering the development of human resources, research
and innovation and, in general, improving the standard of living and attractiveness of the
regions. Although the room for public funding and redistribution is limited by balanced
budget requirements, the impact on the less developed regions can be very substantial if the
forces of agglomeration and dispersion of economic activity, as they are laid out in the New
Economic Geography literature, are taken into account.
This paper presents a spatial general equilibrium framework in which the interplay of
agglomeration and dispersion forces, including the ones set in motion by cohesion policy
can be analysed in a novel and theoretically consistent way, including the impact in the net
contributing Member States. Particular attention is paid to income, migration flows and
capital movements within and between regions that are generated by the stimulus to the
regions. This will allow an assessment of the feedback to the Member States and regions and
the possibility that in the longer run they will all benefit from the additional growth that is
generated.
The paper carefully analyses the implications of different assumptions on capital and
labour mobility within and between Member States on the spatial equilibrium in terms of
income and employment. In doing so, it sheds new light on how the success of cohesion
policy can be measured. A greater focus on unemployment and other indicators of structural
deficiencies may be warranted, instead of on income per capita. The paper recognises the
limitations of a comparative static approach and advocates further work and extensions of the
model and its potential use in the direction of dynamics, in particular by incorporating the
results of research on long-term productivity developments and migration between regions.
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